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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE DEBTOR v. CREDITOR DILEMMA: WHEN DOES A
CREDITOR'S COMMUNICATION WITH A DEBTOR'S
EMPLOYER RESULT IN AN ACTIONABLE
INVASION OF PRIVACY?
Malcom E. Calkin'
The familar story of the small snowball that is gently rolled down
a steep hill, gathering size as it gains speed until it becomes almost
beyond dimension, demonstrates the phenomenal growth of consumer
credit since World War II. There is presently 35 times more outstand-
ing consumer credit than in 1945.' Business interests have opened the
gates of credit to such a degree that today there is an average of $800
credit outstanding for every man, woman and child in the United
States. With no reduction in sight this avalanche of credit needs to
be carefully watched, from a legal standpoint, for numerous abuses by
debtors and creditors.
An easing of credit restrictions, in an effort to boost sales and prof-
its, coupled with intensive advertising campaigns have caused middle
and lower level income groups to indulge more freely in installment
purchases. Since this group is generally more susceptible to 'incurring
greater debts than it can afford, numerous debtor-creditor problems
have arisen.4  Faced with a potentially greater number of defaulting
1. 59 FED. RESERVE BULL. A54 (1973) which states: There was 5.6 billion
dollars of consumer credit in 1945 with 174.8 billion as of Oct., 1973.
2. Based upon the latest official population figures there has been a 38% increase
in population over the past 39 years. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC ATLAS AND
YEARBOOK 699 (28th ed. 1974). In comparison, credit has shot up 97%. Such an
astounding gain has caused some to remark that money has now become a substitute
for credit!
3. Jordan, The UCC, 68 COLuM. L. REV. 387, 433 (1968).
4. Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, 33 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 641 (1971).
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debtors, along with accompanying lost profits, some creditors and their
agents have devised new tactics, together with a more pressurized im-
plementation of older techniques, in an endeavor to extract debtor pay-
ments." As might be expected, a variety of abuses have resulted from
excesses in creditor diligence.
Because the floodgates of credit appear to be opening even wider
in the future, a closer look at the legal acceptability of one of the most
popular and effective means6 creditors have discovered would seem ad-
vantageous. This comment will be restricted to exploring the bounds
that a creditor should be limited to in communicating with the debtor's
employer concerning the debt that is allegedly owed. While there are
numerous tort theories that could be used by an injured debtor-plain-
tiff,7 this discussion will direct itself to an examination of when such
a contact becomes an actionable invasion of privacy, a reflection upon
the adequacy of present case law, and proposed solutions.
The basic concept underlying the rather recent8 and still evolving
tort of invasion of privacy is that every person has a right to be free
from unwarranted intrusions and publicity-a right to be left alonef
It has been characterized as involving four different kinds of invasion
"tied together with one common name."'10 This is to provide the indi-
vidual protection from mental distress"' resulting from a public disclo-
5. For an interesting look at a variety of collection practices see, Halloran,
Collection Practices, 26 Bus. LAWYER 899 (1971) and, Birkhead, Collection Tactics
of Illegal Lenders, 8 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 78 (1941).
6. "The tactic [telling the employer of the debt of one of his employees] is, in
fact, so efficacious as a collection device that it is one of the standard collection meth-
ods .... ." Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, Inc., 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d
835, 840 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
7. Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 15 (1972)
where the traditional tort theories of defamation, invasion of the right of privacy, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with contractual relations, abuse
of process and others are discussed. See also, Scheinfeld, Current Trends in Restriction
of Creditor Collection Activities, 9 HousToN L. Rnv. 615 (1972).
8. The article by Warren and Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rnv.
193 (1890) was the first to fully articulate the subject.
9. Norris v. Moskins Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961); Timper-
ley v. Chase Collection Serv., 272 Cal. App. 2d 697, 77 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Ct. App.
1969); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967, (Ct. App. 1927).
10. Prosser, LAw OF TORTS, 804-14 (4th ed. 1971) where the four types are
presented as being: "appropriation, for the defendant's benefit or advantages, of the
plaintiff's name or likeness; intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion;
public disclosure of private facts; publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light
in the public eye."
11. The intentional infliction of mental suffering is beginning to emerge as a new
tort. Yonder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862 (1962); see, comment, Re-
covery For Creditor Harrassment, 46 TEx. L. REv. 950 (1968).
[Vol. 10:231
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sure 2 of private,13 embarrassing facts' 4 that are sufficiently indentifiable
to the injured party."5  Expressed 6 or implied'7 consent is a valid de-
fense, while truth' s or an absence of malice'9 is not. Recent court rul-
ings have held that any form of communication will be sufficient to sup-
port such a cause of action whether written or verbal.20 It must always
be kept in mind that this right to be left alone is not an absolute one.2
A person cannot expect to live in today's complex, urbanized society
without experiencing some intrusions.
Accordingly, the giving of "unreasonable" publicity to a private
debt results in a violation of the debtor's right to privacy. 2  Where
only a slight invasion has occurred, or one that is warranted, it has been
termed by the courts non-actionable. Differentiating between ac-
tionable and non-actionable privacy invasions involves looking at the
interests of the numerous parties involved. The interests of the credi-
tor, debtor, employer and society must all be judicially measured and
then balanced according to their relative weights. Therefore, a brief
look at the interests each has should serve to put judicial decisions into
12. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962);
Tollefson v. Price, 247 Ore. 398, 430 P.2d 990, (1967).
13. Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (Ct. App.
1941).
14. Such a disclosure must be offensive to a person of reasonable sensibilities.
See, Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (Ct.
App. 1950).
15. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243, (1944).
16. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967, 970 (Ct. App. 1927).
17. Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306, (Ct.
App. 1949).
18. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243, 252 (1944); Brents v. Morgan,
221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967, 970 (Ct. App. 1927).
19. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243, 252 (1944); Brents v. Morgan,
221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967, 970 (Ct. App. 1927).
20. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 793, 216 P.2d 571 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950);
Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896
(1947).
21. "Some shocks and inconveniences members of society must absorb without
redress." Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225, 227
(Ct. App. 1950). "No individual can live in an ivory tower and at the same time
participate in society and expect complete noninterference from other members of the
public." Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951).
22. Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 135 N.E.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1955), affd 133
N.E.2d 350 (1956) (3 dissents) (creditor contacted debtor often at place of employ-
ment in addition to telephoning the employer, landlord, and the debtor's residence
many times and occasionally late at night).
23. "A single phone call to an employer advising that a certain employee was re-
fusing to pay . . . would not constitute either 'undue' or 'oppressive' publicity and
would not be an actionable violation .... ." Lewis v. Physicans and Dentist Credit
Bureau, 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896, 899 (1947).
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perspective.2 4
The creditor's interest includes the right to collect the debt when
it becomes due in as rapid and convenient a manner as possible. If
the debtor should refuse to pay the debt at the agreed time, for what-
ever reason, it does not appear logical to conclude that the creditor now
is replete with the right to punish the defaulter in any way he sees fit,
as this is a function of the courts and a question for society to solve.
The debtor has both a physical and mental interest to protect,
along with an interest in his property. Consequently, his self-respect,
standing in the community, and employment interest must all be consid-
ered as protected. The employment relationship between an employer
and employee, often thought of in terms of a property interest, 25 needs
further protection as the curtailment of it would have drastic economic
effects upon the former employee and his dependents. Clearly, a
property owner would not be expected to relinquish his property inter-
ests to one who may not have a just claim to it; likewise, neither should
an employee be forced to leave his job due to the yet unjustified ac-
tions of a third party. 6
The debtor's employer has an interest in hiring only qualified per-
sonnel who will perform efficiently and properly represent the em-
ployer in the community, without causing undue expense or loss of
time.27 No doubt the debts of the employee could be a factor affecting,
to a varying degree, all of -the foregoing criteria which would be used
24. For a more detailed examination of these interests refer to Greenfield, supra
note 7, at 7.
25. Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. H.W. Ivey Constr. Co., 109 Ga. 876, 137
S.E.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1964), construing, Southern Ry. Co. v. Chambers, 126 Ga. 404,
55 S.E. 37 (1906).
26. "Most jurisdictions hold that an action will lie by inducing a breach of con-
tract by the use of moral, social or economic pressures, in themselves lawful, unless
there is sufficient justification for such inducement..
It is well established, however, that a person is not justified in inducing a breach of
contract ...to further his own economic interest at the expense of the other." Im-
perial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. Rptr. 33, 112 P.2d 631, 632 & 633 (1941).
27. Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1948), accord,
Yonder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862, 867 (1962); but see, Hawley v.
Professional Credit Bureau, Inc., 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835, 843 (1956) (dis-
sent), where it is stated:
Per contra, we are referred to certain cases in which it is said that the em-
ployer may properly be told of such debts because he has a legitimate interest
in the matter, since a debt-free employee is a more efficient employee. The
argument proves too much. A love-sick employee, also is far from efficient.
Should we call upon the boss to scotch romance? What we are looking at, in
essence, is simply a matter of human dignity, the right to live our lives without
the meddlesom e interference of others, the simple right t o lbe l ef Jonq,
[Vol. 10:231
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by a successful employer in selecting and retaining employees.
Society has a very definite interest underlying all of the previously
mentioned ones. This naturally results in conflicts which require a
resolution. For instance, there is a desire to protect -the individual from
harrassment yet encourage debt paying and the free flow of commerce.
Society desires to keep the courts uncongested yet does not want to
force, as a result, an unjustified payment from one party to another.
Our nation frowns upon the punitive aspects of debt punishment
through imprisonment"' and encourages the continuation of employ-
ment even though valid debts exist.
With such a vast array of divergent claims presented, earlier court
decisions generally favored the creditor when suits were brought on an
invasion of privacy -theory.29 However, there has been a trend, noticed
by at least one early decision,30 toward curbing the more abusive and
offensive practices of creditors.
The flexibile, yet elusive rule of reasonableness is usually cited
by the courts as their guiding light,3 yet the application of such a rule
necessitates close scrutiny. While courts have unanimously approved
the practice of a creditor's telephoning or writing a debtor's employer
to inform him of a debt owed,32 they have in certain cases ruled against
creditors when "harassment"' or "oppressive conduct"3 4 has been
used. Just where this fine legal line is to be drawn can only be de-
termined from the particular facts presented in each case.35 For in-
28. Comment, Criminal Sanctions Protecting the Credit Seller, 98 U. PA. L. Ruv.
230 (1949). This comment indicates that during the period debtor imprisonment was
used there were three to five times as many persons imprisoned for debt as for crimes,
with most of the unpaid accounts being very small. This practice was discontinued
about 1830 in America and England.
29. This could be explained, in part, by the fact that the tort of invasion of pri-
vacy took time to develop and become acceptable to very many jurisdictions. In Ham-
berger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1965), the court gave a capsule sum-
mary of the history of the tort concluding that since Pavesich v. New England Life
Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 19, 50 S.E. 68 (1905), which upheld the right of privacy, it has
been given protection in a majority of the jurisdictions, usually without benefit of
statute, with only a few rejecting the concept.
30. Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
31. McKenzie v. Huckaby, 112 F. Supp. 642 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Household Fin.
Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 250 A.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1969).
32. Harrison v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 264 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.S.C. 1967); Yon-
der v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862, 864 (1962); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio
St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340, 344 (1956).
33. Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340, 344 (1956).
34. Holloway v. Davis, 77 Ala. 346, 208 So. 2d 794 (Ct. App. 1967).
35. Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
1974]
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stance, in Pack v. Wise,36 the court held that numerous, unnecessary
communiques between creditor and debtor's employer, culminating in
the debtor's being fired, was coercive to an unreasonable degree. Both
the number of contacts,3 7 their coercive content 8 and whether or not
a release in employment was threatened or carried out" appear to be
salient facts for some courts while others prefer to speak in terms of
a "systematic campaign of harassment '40 as being required.
When the issue of the reasonableness of a creditor's messages to
a debtor's employer has been litigated, many courts ruling in the credi-
tor's favor have accepted one or more of the following arguments: in
the case of a small debt the creditor is left with no other effective legal
recourse; 41 such communication does not constitute an invasion of pri-
vacy as an employer has a valid interest in his employee's financial sta-
tus; 42 notification of only a few persons, such as an employer, is not
sufficient to be classed as a public disclosure;43 by allowing such con-
tacts the courts are left relatively free to handle other matters;44 the
debtor would prefer that his employer be contacted in preference to
litigation;45 and finally, a debtor waived his right to privacy (at least
36. 245 La. 84, 155 So. 2d 909 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 157 So. 2d 231 (1963).
The court seemed to place special emphasis on the fact that after the debtor had in-
formed the creditor of his defense to the claim the creditor again brought the matter
to the attention of the employer. This was ruled tortious conduct.
37. Pack v. Wise, 245 La. 84, 155 So. 2d 909 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 157 So. 2d
231 (1963) (numerous); LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253
N.W. 424 (1934) (over forty); Duty v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 154 Tex. 16,
273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) (numerous).
38. Norris v. Moskins Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961) (where
a creditor suggested an illicit relationship on the debtor's part in an attempt to cause
payment of a debt); Quina v. Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. Ct. App. 1944) (where a
creditor used a pseudo-legal form to mislead the employer with the intention of forcing
the debtor to liquidate a debt of $1.45).
39. Holloway v. Davis, 77 Ala. 346, 208 So. 2d 794 (Ct. App. 1967) (demotion
threatened); Pack v. Wise, 245 La. 84, 155 So. 2d 909 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 157
So. 2d 231 (1963) (employee discharged).
40. Biederman's of Springfield v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959); Mont-
gomery Wards v. Larragorite, 81 N.M. 383, 467 P.2d 399 (1970).
41. Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340, 344 (1956); compare,
Household Fin. Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 250 A.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1969) with
Guthridbe v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
42. Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951).
43. Tolfson v. Safeway, 142 Colo. 442, 351 P.2d 274 (1960); but see Housh v.
Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 135 N.E.2d 440, 448 (Ct. App. 1955), affd, 133 N.E.2d 340
(1956), where the court stated that: "An invasion of privacy may result without the
matter being brought to the attention of the general public. Typical of this class of
cases are wiretapping and other forms of eavesdropping. In such cases, the public is
not informed or involved."
44. See, Household Fin. Corp. v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 250 A.2d 878 (Ct. App.
1969).
45. Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Ky. Ct. App. 1591).
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in so far as it relates to his employer being informed) when he re-
quested the credit.4"
Debtors have attempted to rebut these arguments by claiming that
coercion is the primary motive behind such communication. Certain
courts have pointed out the following factors favoring the debtor. The
creditor anticipates a "trial by employer" where an employee's rights
and defenses are lightly regarded at best. Justice is based more upon
expediency and social bias than -the law, with the constitutional guar-
antees of due process and equal protection of the laws unknown.47
Even if the employee settles the debt, usually at the mercy of the credi-
tor, to retain his job, the employer might still regard the employee sus-
piciously and bypass him with regard to future promotions or salary ii-
creases.43 While an employer may have a valid interest in his employ-
ee's debts, even this should be curtailed to the point that a concerned
employer does not attempt to usurp the legitimate function of a court-
dispute settling. Not all debtors would prefer their employer being
told of their obligation to a judicial settlement,49 especially if they felt
a valid defense was available and desired the safeguards inherent with
a court of law. Lastly, it is unconscionable to allow a creditor free reign
in collecting the debt just because the debtor availed himself of credit.
It is very doubtful if any intelligent waiver took place, especially if no
specific mention of it was given in the agreement. In any event credit
procurement should not create an unlimited license to coerce.5"
Even though the majority of courts have allowed creditors to con-
tact their debtor's employer, the standard of reasonableness has been
applied to limit the collector. The major problem here has been the
uneven application of the rule. In Booth v. American Finance Cor-
poration of Shreveport,51 the court ruled that unreasonable and coercive
46. Gouldman-Tabor Pontiac v. Zerbest, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957).
47. Note, Torts-Liability of Creditor for Contacting Employer of Debtor as a
Collection Method, 24 LA. L. Rav. 953 (1964). See also, Pack v. Wise, 245 La. 84,
155 So. 2d 909 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 157 So. 2d 231 (1963); Quina v. Roberts,
16 So. 2d 558 (La. Ct. App. 1944).
48. See, Holloway v. Davis, 77 Ala. 346, 208 So. 2d 794 (Ct. App. 1967) (where
an employee was threatened with a demotion if his "debt" was not paid).
49. See, Birkhead, Collection Tactics of Illegal Lenders, 8 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 78 (1941) where it is noted that most employees are very reluctant to discuss
their personal affairs with company officials. The employer does not want to be
bothered with such matters and usually desires a quick settlement.
50. "But the license to pursue the debtor is not a license to outrage the debtor."
Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709, 713. (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
51. 254 La. 782, 224 So. 2d 512 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 226 So. 2d 771 (1969).
19741
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action resulted from repetitious letters and telephone calls to the debt-
or's employer. This result seems to flow from the further facts that
the debt was disputed and that the nature of the communication was
"intended to frighten the plaintiff into settling the debt or possibly be-
ing fired." 2  Similar facts were present in Timperly v. Chase Collec-
tion Service53 where again a disputed debt existed and the collector
contacted the debtor's employer. Here, -however, the court ruled
against the debtor, saying that even though the creditor "knew the like-
lihood of the appellant's (debtor) being pressured by his employer to
pay"54 it would still be protected as it was privileged communication.
The decision in Timperley refused to recognize actionable coercion on
the creditor's part regardless of the fact that the debt was clearly dis-
puted,55 the letter sent to the employer did not reflect this, and the
debtor lost his job as a direct result of his refusal to quickly settle the
debt. Such a judicial approach seems to afford the debtor little protec-
tion against the whim of an aggressive debt collector, as manifest
through a cooperative employer, who has not been supplied adequate
information about the debt.
In Quina v. Roberts, 6 the court ruled in the debtor's favor after
the creditor sent a letter to the employer which erroneously implied
that it had been issued through a legal channel. Characterizing it as
"misleading" and "coercive" the decision seems to provide some rem-
edy for harrassed employees. Where collection letters asking for the
employer's assistance have strongly tended to imply dishonesty on the
debtor's part, some courts have ruled in favor of the debtor5  How-
ever, these decisions have been criticized for not developing proper ju-
dicial standards."'
Gouldman-Tabor Pontiac v. Zerbest 9 involves the factual situa-
52. Id. at 516.
53. 272 Cal. App. 2d 697, 77 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Ct. App. 1969). For a similar case
with the same outcome refer 'to Berrier v. Beneficial Fin., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 204 (N.D.
Ind. 1964).
54. Timperley at 784.
55. It has been reported that "at least 20% of all debtors have valid defenses."
Bansberg, Courts Are Held Creditors' Allies, New York Times, July 19, 1971, at 17,
col. 3.
56. 16 So. 2d 558 (La. Ct. App. 1944).
57. See, Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman, Inc., 181 Ky. 487, 205 S.W. 558 (Ct.
App. 1918) (where the placing of a number of conspicuous cards around plaintiff's
property telling that a collector had called and requesting a visit to the store was held
actionable by the court); Neaton v. Lewis Apparel Stores, 267 App. Div. 728, 48
N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct.), motion for leave to appeal allowed, 50 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1944).
58. Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Ky. CL App. 1951).
59. 100 S.E.2d 881 (Ga. 1957).
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ion of the sending by a creditor of a letter informing the employer
that he was attempting to collect an "honest debt" that was owed. The
employer promptly notified the employee that the letter would be
placed in his permanent employment file until the debt was settled.
Even though the employee claimed no such debt existed, with the cred-
itor being so aware when the letter was sent, the court ruled that the
creditor acted in a manner reasonably designed to "persuade her to pay
her bills and upon failure to persuade to force her to do so through
the courts."60  The court here recognizes that it is its duty to make
final adjudication of a contested debt, but does not believe that any
great harm will result if a job-conscious employee is, in effect, forced
to pay off a debt he may not legally owe, due to the overly persuasive
practices of a creditor. Such a decision puts the onus on the employee
to either settle with the creditor or accept a blemished personnel rec-
ord, even if no legally collectable debt exists.
In another case, 61 an innocuous letter telling the employer of an
alleged debt of one of his employees also contained, at the bottom, a
separate section to be torn off and placed in the employee's next pay-
check by the employer. This stub informed the employee that he was
requested to straighten out the matter immediately. The Kentucky
court ruled this not to be an invasion of the debtor's right of privacy
since the letter did not contain a coercive word. No discussion was
made of the creditor's written stub even though this appears to indicate
a siding of the employer with the creditor and an implication that the
worker had better resolve the matter quickly or face the consequences,
regardless of the debt's authenticity.
LaSalle Extension University v. Fogarty62 illustrates the point that
some courts consider the fact of the existence of a debt a sufficient
factor to consider in limiting collection practices. This would mean that
if no valid debt is found to exist a collector's tactic would be scrutinized
more carefully; but not all courts agree on this. 3
Oklahoma at present has little legislation affecting collection con-
duct. The Uniform Consumer Commercial Code has two sections
60. Id. at 883; see also, Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919)
(where a creditor attempted to "blackmail" a debtor by threatening public disclosure
of a debtors list).
61. Lewis v. Moskins Stores, 262 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (three judges
dissented).
62. 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
63. Pack v. Wise, 245 La. 84, 155 So. 2d 909 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 157 So. 2d
231 (1963); Quin4 v. Roberts, 16 $o. 2d 558, 561 (La, Ct. App. 1944).
19741
9
Calkins: The Debtor v. Creditor Dilemma: When Does a Creditor's Communicat
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
which speak in general terms of "unconscionable conduct. ' 4  While
the UCCC has a potentially powerful weapon in the administrator, who
is given authority 'to bring suits seeking injunctions against certain con-
duct, 65 the vagueness of the term "unconscionable" has been a continu-
ing objection since it does not afford any reliable course of behavior
for the creditor until judicially spelled out.06
Private suits do not always work well due to the relatively small
amounts involved, debtor ignorance of legal recources available, and
the high cost of attorney fees.0 7 These actions should still be allowed
as a safeguard against an administrator who becomes overly sympa-
thetic to creditors or feels the debtor's claim is marginal due to budget
limitations and takes no action as a result. But in the end most indi-
viduals fear losing a private suit and bypass the courts.08
The Uniform Consumer Commercial Code's administrator con-
cept, the flexibility of the term "unconscionable", and the encourage-
ment of private suits are all beneficial, but are not in themselves suf-
ficient to solve the problem completely enough. What is needed is
a more basic initial approach which would get to the genesis of the di-
lemma and fill the gaps in the previously mentioned remedies.
A partial solution -to the present dilemma would be in judicial and
legislative curtailment of collection letters and telephone calls directed
to the debtor's employer. To completely prohibit any such contact, as
some have argued, 69 would ignore the generally accepted belief that
an employer does have a valid interest in his employee's financial obli-
gations. However, careful guidelines need to be developed to insure
that such contacts are "informational" rather than coercive. As prev-
iously noted, 70 it is when the communique becomes misleading to the
employer that it becomes objectionable. To remedy this a creditor
should be required to clearly and conspicuously state that the fact or
amount of the debt is disputed and that the employer is not expected
or encouraged to exert pressure on the employee to pay the debt. Fur-
thermore, the number of times a creditor should be allowed to com-
64. OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A §§ 5-108(1), 6-111 (1971).
65. OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A § 6-111 (1971).
66. Jordan and Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COL. L. Rnv.
387 (1968).
67. Id.
68. Comment, Enforcement Under The UCCC, 55 MNmN. L. Rlv. 572 (1971).
69. Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835, 842
(1956) (dissent).
70. See cases cited notes 38, 51 & 57, supra.
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municate with the employer should be limited to one. This would les-
sen the "systematic campaign of harassment" practice indulged in by
disreputable collectors. To avoid surprise on the employee-debtor's
part, prior notice of the anticipated employer contact should be re-
quired from the creditor. This should take the form of a copy of the
letter that will be sent to the employer being first given to the em-
ployee. Finally, upon being informed that a debtor has retained an
attorney to represent him, a collector should not be allowed to commu-
nicate directly with the debtor, unless -the attorney has advised the col-
lector otherwise.
Generally speaking, collection agencies are the groups who apply
the most "pressure practices", as they are often attempting to collect
from those unable or unwilling to pay. While most agencies operate
in an aboveboard fashion there still exists a minority that do not hesitate
to coerce and harass the debtor. In order to practically implement the
previously suggested rules, legislation should be enacted to set up a
Collection Agency Regulatory Board. Following the basic pattern in
such states as Massachusetts"1 and California7 2 the board could keep
out the incompetent operator by instituting licensing requirements and
determining what constitutes acceptable conduct in debt collection gen-
erally. Under such a plan there would be the needed flexibility to stop
new, unacceptable practices, yet enough specificity to insure a clear
course of conduct for all reputable collection agencies. A wronged
party need only file a complaint with the board in the event that a li-
censed agency is involved. While all creditors would not be covered
under such legislation, hopefully the result would be an aid in reducing
offensive and unreasonable collection practices. With obvious benefits
accruing to harassed debtors, such a system should also assist the col-
lector by clearly pointing out unacceptable conduct.
In conclusion, while an upsurge in credit use has heightened col-
lection activity and the need for knowing the legal bounds of such ac-
tion, the courts have been ineffectual in delineating a clear line be-
tween honest, reasonable efforts and coercive conduct. This seems es-
71. MASS. GEN. L&ws ANNOT. ch. 93, § 24-28 and ch. 272, § 97(a) (1972).
Also of particular interest, as reported in 35 UNAUTHr ZzED PRACccE NEWs 27,
(Dec., 1970), is the Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks' adoption of stringent reg-
ulations respecting the business conduct of collection agencies. Such matters as at-
torney involvement, company name, records, communication with anyone other than
the debtor, expenses charged to the debtor, debtor lists, use of return addresses, times
of communication and deceptive practices are all rather strictly curtailed.
72. CALiF. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6947 (1974).
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pecially true in the area of creditor-employer communication relating
to employee debts. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code has attempted
to deal with such abuses, but its shortcomings are apparent. Although
not a complete solution, the establishment of a state agency to control
the licensing and conduct of collection businesses seems to go one step
further in better protecting the debtor from abusive collectors.
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